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Abstract
This paper investigates the effect of FDI on economic growth conditional on the institu-
tional quality of host countries. We consider institutional heterogeneity to be an explanation
for the mixed results of previous empirical studies and we develop several arguments to show
that institutional quality modulates the intensity of FDI impact on growth. Using a compre-
hensive data set for institutional quality, we test this hypothesis on a sample of 94 developing
countries over the period 1984-2009. The use of Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR)
allows us to identify both the heterogeneity and the threshold of institutional quality that
influence the FDI growth effect. These results have significant implications for policy se-
quencing in developing countries. In order to benefit from FDI-led growth, the improvement
of the institutional framework should precede FDI attraction policies. While some features
of institutional quality have an immediate effect on fostering FDI-led growth, others need
a consistent accumulation of efforts, therefore challenging the effectiveness of institutional
reforms in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
When searching for solutions to boost economic growth in developing countries, foreign
direct investment (FDI) is seen as an important stimulus for productivity gains through
the introduction of new processes and know-how, managerial skills, employee training
and access to international markets. Endogenous growth theory supports the idea of a
multiplier mechanism of FDI spillovers to domestic firms, which leads to positive effects on
aggregate productivity and economic growth (Grossman & Helpman (1991), Barro & Sala-
i-Martin (1997)). Since developing economies often suffer from liquidity constraints, FDI
also acts as a substitute for local investment in the capital accumulation process (Mody &
Murshid (2005)). As a result, FDI inflows were particularly encouraged by governments in
developing countries, leading to an increasing share of FDI in total capital flows.
Despite consistent theoretical arguments1, empirical evidence on the growth effect of
FDI is still inconclusive. A recent literature survey by Bruno & Campos (2013) shows
that 50% of empirical studies report a significantly positive effect of FDI on growth, 11%
find a negative effect while 39% find growth to be independent of FDI. It thus seems that
FDI plays an ambiguous role in generating economic growth, with little support for an
independent positive effect.
The explanations for these conflicting results have pointed to methodological issues
(Carkovic & Levine (2005)) and to the different absorptive capacity of host countries
(Blomstro¨m & Kokko (2003), Lipsey & Sjo¨holm (2005)). Empirical research seems to con-
verge to the conclusion that the effect of FDI on economic growth is conditional on several
local circumstances, as the level of development (Blomstrom, Lipsey & Zejan (1994)), trade
openness (Balasubramanyam, Salisu & Sapsford (1996)), human capital (Borensztein, De
Gregorio & Lee (1998)), financial development (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan & Sayek-
nomics (2004)) or the business environment (Busse & Groizard (2008)).
In line with the recent emphasis on the role of institutions in economic growth2, weak in-
stitutions are likely to be responsible for several economic problems in developing countries.
Lower institutional quality is often associated with lower investment, slower productivity
1See for instance Markusen & Venables (1999) or Keller & Yeaple (2009).
2See Aghion, Alesina & Trebbi (2008), Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001), Rodrik, Subramanian
& Trebbi (2004) and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1998).
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growth, lower per capita income and overall slower output growth. It is thus only natural
to expect institutions to have a significant modulating role in the FDI-growth relationship.
While a good level of institutional development can favor synergies between FDI and lo-
cal firms and hence promote productivity spillovers, it can also induce complementarities
between foreign and domestic investment and therefore increase capital accumulation. On
the contrary, an underdeveloped institutional framework can disrupt productive activities
and may prevent the exploitation of knowledge spillovers by domestic firms. If this is the
case, countries with the same level of FDI may experience very different growth outcomes
according to their institutional quality.
While a number of studies investigate the role of institutions in attracting FDI flows3,
there is very limited research dealing with institutions in explaining FDI effects (Busse
& Groizard (2008), Farole & Winkler (2012)). In order to provide some insights on this
issue, in this paper we investigate the conditionality of the FDI growth effect on several
features of institutional quality, like political risk, law enforcement, bureaucratic quality,
corruption or expropriation risk. We argue that well developed institutions enhance the
overall benefits of FDI on economic growth. As Nair-Reichert & Weinhold (2001), we
consider host country heterogeneity, in its wider form, to be a plausible explanation for
the mixed results of empirical studies.
Our research has several original features compared to the existing literature. First,
we develop several theoretical arguments to show that institutional quality modulates
the two main channels of FDI impact on economic growth, namely knowledge spillovers
and capital accumulation. Second, while existing empirical studies use limited measures
of institutions, we use a comprehensive set of 11 indicators that allow us to capture all
features of institutional quality. Third, the use of Panel Smooth Transition Regression
models allows us to highlight the heterogeneity of the FDI effect on economic growth,
as given by institutional quality. Alternatively, for robustness checks, we rely on the
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. Finally, the PSTR method allows us
to reveal endogenous threshold values for institutional indicators associated with a shift in
the FDI-growth relationship.
3Busse & Hefeker (2007), Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan & Volosovych (2008), Javorcik & Wei (2009), Ali,
Fiess & MacDonald (2010), Buchanan, Le & Rishi (2012).
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Our empirical analysis shows that institutional quality modulates the effect of FDI
on economic growth in developing countries. While FDI alone has no significant growth
effect, there is a minimum level of institutional quality that induces a growth enhancing
effect. We thus highlight the importance of heterogeneity in analyzing the FDI-growth re-
lationship, as we show the existence of two extreme regimes in the FDI-growth mechanism.
This has two significant policy implications for developing countries. First, sequencing is
needed in implementing economic policies: governments should first improve the regulatory
framework before engaging in FDI attraction policies. Second, in designing institutional
reforms, some features of institutional quality prove to payoff faster in terms of marginal
effect on growth. Therefore, priority should be given to these specific features, as further
institutional complementarities would eventually lead to an incremental effect on growth.
With the drop in global FDI flows in the turmoil of the recent economic crisis, com-
petition among developing countries has intensified in order to attract foreign investors.
Since large amounts of public funds have been devoted to FDI attraction policies, identi-
fying the specific conditions that favor the returns on FDI is thus of great importance for
policymakers in developing countries. Seeking to provide some guidance to this end, our
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the main arguments in favor of a
conditioning role of institutions in the FDI-growth relationship. Section 3 describes the
data and the methodology being used, while Section 4 presents the results and discusses
their robustness. Section 5 highlights the main conclusions and policy implications for
developing countries.
2 How can institutional quality influence the growth
effect of FDI?
Several studies investigate the role of institutions in attracting FDI flows, confirming FDI
abundance in countries with sound institutional quality4. Since most FDI originates in
developed countries, it is natural for multinationals to try to minimize the institutional
distance between the home and the host country environments. Institutions appear there-
4See Busse & Hefeker (2007), Alfaro et al. (2008), Buchanan et al. (2012).
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fore to be a robust predictor of FDI inflows in developing countries, especially in what
concerns property rights (Ali et al. (2010)).
In this paper, we go beyond the role of institutions as a determinant of FDI inflows
and consider institutional quality as a feature of absorptive capacity. While there is no
theoretical indication in the literature on the interaction between institutions and FDI in
generating growth, we develop several arguments supporting the idea of a heterogeneous
effect of FDI on growth depending on institutions. To this end, we evaluate the influence
of institutions on the two traditional channels of FDI led growth, namely technological
spillovers and capital accumulation.
2.1 Institutional quality and productivity spillovers
The core influence of FDI on economic growth consists of productivity improvements from
foreign affiliates to domestic firms. These spillovers can occur through supplier and cus-
tomer linkages, increased competition, demonstration effects or labor turnover. We argue
that good institutions can shape the relationship between foreign and domestic firms and
therefore affect the extent of spillovers. The institutional theory (North (1990)) suggests
that institutions set market rules, structure interactions among economic actors and ensure
that economic actions are bounded by these rules. Furthermore, Meyer & Sinani (2009)
argue that the institutional framework creates incentives and business practices that in-
fluence the nature of competition and the knowledge acquisition process. Both foreign
and domestic firms are encouraged to compete in an environment protected by market
rules. Adversely, bad institutions are often associated with high transaction costs and an
increased risk for long term trade commitments, loosening the ties between foreign and
domestic firms. Moreover, direct technology transfer from the multinational to the affiliate
depends on the quality of the host country’s institutional environment, namely the pro-
tection of property rights. In the case of severe risk of technology leakage, multinationals
prefer to transfer low-level technology, with smaller spillover potential.
As a complement to Busse & Hefeker (2007) and Ali et al. (2010), we argue that insti-
tutions can influence not only the quantity, but also the quality of FDI, as foreign firms
are non-homogeneous and of varying qualities concerning knowledge-spillovers. Bad insti-
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tutional quality is likely to attract low-technology, resource exploiting FDI, with limited
growth potential. Demonstration effects of foreign firms are thus stronger if institutions
are well developed (Blomstro¨m & Kokko (2003)). Uncertainty associated with lower in-
vestors’ protection, expropriation risk or inefficient law enforcement discourages high-end
technological investments, which have the highest knowledge-spillover potential.
Institutions might also influence the entry mode of FDI, as an unstable institutional
environment discourages risk taking behavior and therefore favors mergers and acquisitions.
As opposed to greenfield investment, mergers and acquisitions have a less growth enhancing
effect (Wang & Wong (2009)) due to the fact that they do not consist of a net creation of
activity5. Furthermore, bad institutions could also deter agglomeration effects, known to
be important factors in explaining the FDI growth relationship (Hilber & Voicu (2010)).
An implicit consequence of institutional quality could be reduced information asymme-
tries, as good institutions efficiently channel information to market participants and allow
proper exploitation of market opportunities, which in turn favors technology transfer. Re-
duced information asymmetries could have a significant role in generating spillovers, both
through the competition mechanism and the demonstration/imitation effects. Finally, the
institutional environment might have implications for labor mobility between foreign and
domestic firms. Excessive labor market regulation may prevent workers trained in multi-
nationals to join domestic firms, therefore hindering potential productivity spillovers.
2.2 Institutional quality and capital accumulation
A second line of action of FDI on economic growth passes through capital accumulation and
potential crowding-in effects on domestic investment. Mody & Murshid (2005) have shown
that FDI has a short term crowding-out effect in developing countries, while stimulating
domestic investment in the long run. Morrissey & Udomkerdmongkol (2012) argue that
the extent of crowding out is actually related to political stability in host countries. More
precisely, the initial crowding-out effect seems to be more than compensated by larger
capital accumulation in politically stable regimes. We thus argue that sound institutions
5Furthermore, if we take the example of former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a
weak institutional environment has often led to inefficiencies in the privatization process with penalizing
effects on growth.
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may reduce the crowding-out effect by encouraging foreign investment in new industries,
where competition with domestic firms is less intense. Sound institutions can also efficiently
channel the demand for inputs created by the entry of FDI towards local suppliers and
therefore stimulate domestic activity.
The interaction between foreign and domestic investment can also occur through the
financial market, especially in the case of mergers and acquisitions. As a financial flow,
FDI increases the local capital supply and can favor a decrease in the market interest
rate (Harrison, Love & McMillan (2004)). Domestic firms thus indirectly benefit from
better access to credit and improved financial market conditions. This effect seems to be
especially important in developing countries, where capital supply is scarce, provided that
a minimum level of financial development is acquired. In this sense, we argue that sound
financial institutions are needed for mobilizing and channeling capital towards domestic
firms, by ensuring improved capital allocation and appropriate risk management. On the
contrary, the lack of transparency in financial institutions could alter the flow of financial
resources stemming from FDI and diminish the associated crowding-in effects.
Finally, low institutional quality is known to distort production and exports away from
manufactured goods to non-manufactured goods (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton
(1999), Me´on & Sekkat (2008)). Additionally, backward and forward linkages between
FDI and domestic firms traditionally arise in the manufacturing sector, while FDI in
non-manufacturing follows a resource seeking strategy will less local reliance and smaller
spillover potential.
In the light of these arguments, we expect sound institutional quality to favor technology
transfer and productivity spillovers to domestic firms, while promoting crowding-in effects
on domestic investment.
3 Testing the heterogeneity of the growth effect of
FDI: methodology and data
There is still very limited research dealing with the catalytic role of institutions in explain-
ing FDI growth effects. In a cross-country context, Busse & Groizard (2008) investigate
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the role of business regulations in both developed and developing countries. They argue
that countries with restrictive regulation cannot exploit FDI inflows efficiently due to con-
straints in factor reallocation. On the contrary, Farole & Winkler (2012) show that business
freedom has no significant effect on intra-industry productivity spillovers from FDI in a
firm-level sample of developing countries. When comparing the growth effects of greenfield
investment and mergers and acquisitions, Harms & Me´on (2011) find both marginal effects
to be independent of corruption and political stability. Finally, Meyer & Sinani (2009) run
a meta-analysis of studies on FDI spillovers, mostly firm level studies, and highlight the
existence of a non-linear relationship between institutions and spillovers.
As compared with the existing literature that concentrates on specific features of insti-
tutional quality, we use a comprehensive set of 11 indicators in order to capture the full
extent of the interaction between institutions and FDI in generating growth. Moreover, we
focus our attention on developing countries as the potential for institutional heterogeneity
allows us to expect the existence of a threshold level influencing the FDI-growth nexus.
3.1 The Panel Smooth Transition Regression model
The arguments in the previous section suggest that the impact of FDI on growth could
depend on specific national factors, in particular institutional quality. This argument
could alternatively explain why existing research fails to find a significant direct impact
on growth. Most empirical papers indirectly assume a constant impact of FDI along the
entire time span and homogeneous among the countries in the sample. Since the absorptive
capacity of a country can improve, i.e. the benefits associated with FDI can intensify, as
institutional quality improves. It is thus reasonable to assume that the FDI impact is not
constant, but rather country or/and time-varying.
The panel smooth transition regression (PSTR hereafter) model proposed by Gonza´lez,
Tera¨svirta & van Dijk (2005) and Fok, van Dijk & Franses (2005) is well suited to address
both the heterogeneity and the time variability issues. The PSTR model can be seen as
a regime-switching model allowing for a small number of extreme regimes. It actually
represents a generalization of the PTR model (Hansen (1999)) in which the coefficients
of some explanatory variables can take different values depending on the value of another
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observable variable (i.e. a “transition variable”). Endogenous values of this transition
variable induce the switch from an extreme regime to another, with an evolution driven
by a potentially smooth transition function. While the PTR model imposes a sharp shift
from a regime to another, the PSTR model allows the regression coefficients to change
gradually.
Considering a given institutional indicator as a transition variable qit, the PSTR model
can be defined as:
yit = µi + β
′
0FDIit + β
′
1FDIit g (qit; γ, c) + α
′zit + uit (1)
where yit is the growth rate of gross domestic product and FDIit is foreign direct investment
in country i at time t, for i = 1,...,N, and t = 1,. . . ,T. µi represents an individual fixed
effect, while zi,t is a k-dimensional vector of growth determinants usually considered in the
literature (see infra). Following Granger & Tera¨svirta (1993) and Gonza´lez et al. (2005),
the transition function g(.) is a continuous function of the transition variable qit, bounded
between 0 and 1:
g(qit; γ, c) =
(
1 + exp
(
−γ
m∏
j=1
(qit − cj)
))−1
(2)
with γ > 0 and c1 6 c2 6 . . . 6 cm, where γ is the slope of the transition function and
c = (c1, . . . , cm)
′ is an m-dimensional vector of threshold (or “location”) parameters. For
m = 1 - namely the case we will focus on6 - there is one threshold of institutional quality,
around which the effect of FDIit on yit is non-linear. This non-linear effect is represented
by a continuum of parameters between two extreme regimes. The first extreme regime
corresponds to g(.) = 0 and is associated with low values of qit, while the second regime
corresponds to g(.) = 1 and is associated with high values of qit. Therefore, as qit increases,
the effect of FDIit evolves from β0 to β0+β1 following a single monotonic transition centered
around the value c of qit
7. Between these two extreme cases, the elasticity of GDP growth
6Gonza´lez et al. (2005) assert that it is sufficient to consider m = 1 or m = 2, as these values allow for
commonly encountered types of variation in the parameters. However, there are no theoretical arguments in
our specific case to justify a U or inverted U elasticity of economic growth with respect to FDI, conditional
on institutional quality. Moreover, note that even with m = 1, such a model considers a continuum of
regimes (between the extreme high and low ones).
7Note that if γ → ∞, the function g(.) becomes an indicator function I[qit > c], and the PSTR is
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to FDI, for country i at time t, is defined as a weighted average of the parameters β0 and
β1:
∂yit
∂FDIit
= β0 + β1 × g (qit; γ, c) (3)
If each country i exhibits a different value of the transition variable at time t, the elasticity
will then be different for each country. Similarly, if a given country has a varying qit, than
its elasticity will be time varying. Another advantage of such a method is the endogenous
determination of the threshold levels. This is particularly relevant for this paper where we
consider the well-known institutional indicators stemming from the ICRG database. For
any indicator in this database, it is easy and straightforward to examine the location of a
country with respect to the identified threshold level.
Before estimating equation (1), we perform a homogeneity test of the FDI-growth
coefficient, conditional on a given transition variable q. This test, presented into detail in
appendix 1, indicates whether a PSTR model is suited to evaluate the effect of FDI on
growth. Moreover, the rejection of the homogeneity hypothesis (H0) against the PSTR
alternative (H1) allows us to select the appropriate transition variables among a set of
theoretical candidates.
Finally, the issue of a potential endogeneity bias must be addressed. Solutions such as
instrumental variable methods have not yet been developed in a PSTR context8. How-
ever, according to Be´reau, Lopez Villavicencio & Mignon (2012), Omay & Kan (2010)
and Fouquau et al. (2008), non-linear modeling strategies can mitigate endogeneity is-
sues. Typically, Lo´pez-Villavicencio & Mignon (2011) estimate the non-linear impact of
inflation on GDP growth with a PSTR model similar to (1). For comparative purposes,
they use the generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate a growth equation with
interaction terms. As they obtain similar results (in terms of interactions significance),
they conclude that the results obtained with the PSTR model are robust to endogeneity
and reverse causality issues. Moreover, as our model captures the varying growth effects
of FDI at different levels of the transition variable, this reduces the potential endogeneity
then equivalent to a two-regime PTR. Conversely, if γ → 0, the model is a standard linear model with
individual effects - the so-called “within” model - with constant and homogeneous elasticity.
8See the discussion in Fouquau, Hurlin & Rabaud (2008), which attempt to use a PSTR with instru-
mental variable method, but acknowledges that the convergence of the estimators has not been formally
proven.
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bias in the same way as the presence of interaction terms in linear models (see Aghion,
Bacchetta, Rancie`re & Rogoff (2009) for more details). Notwithstanding uncertainty about
the endogeneity bias, we use the first lag of FDI, and consequently the lag indicators of
institutional quality in estimating (1)-(2), to circumvent the potential reverse causality
problem. Rather than (1), the equation actually estimated is then:
yit = µi + β
′
0FDIi,t−1 + β
′
1FDIi,t−1 g (qi,t−1; γ, c) + α
′zit + uit (4)
Finally, robustness checks will be performed by comparing the results of the PSTR model
with the GMM estimations of a single growth equation including interaction terms between
FDI and each institutional variable.
3.2 The data
In order to test the effect of FDI on economic growth conditional on the quality of insti-
tutions, we use the net FDI inflows as share of GDP, provided by UNCTAD. Growth is
computed as the annual real growth rate of GDP per capita, stemming from the Word
Development Indicators database.
Traditional determinants of economic growth are included in the regressions as control
variables. The choice of these variables is driven by the numerous developments of growth
theories (see for example Barro (1991)). These determinants are: the initial level of GDP
per capita to control for the effects of conditional convergence, the population annual
growth rate, domestic investment, trade openness, government consumption (used as an
indicator of fiscal policy) and the annual inflation rate. All these variables stem from the
Word Development Indicators database of the World Bank.
In order to measure the quality of domestic institutions, we use the International Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG) database. This database, compiled by the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group, provides information on several risk indicators grouped in three categories:
political, economic and financial risks. For the purpose of our research, we consider 11
indicators related to institutional quality, namely: political risk, government stability, in-
vestment profile, internal conflict, external conflict, corruption, the influence of the military
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in politics, law and order, the degree of tensions among ethnic groups, the democratic ac-
countability of the government and the quality of the bureaucracy. These indicators are
widely used in empirical studies to measure political risk and institutional quality9. The
political risk indicator is a composite index of all other indicators of institutional quality,
ranging from 0 to 100 points. Government stability, investment profile, internal conflict
and external conflict range from 0 to 12, while corruption, military in politics, law and
order, ethnic tensions and democratic accountability range from 0 to 6 points. Finally,
quality of the bureaucracy ranges from 0 to 4. The higher the value of the indicator, the
lower is the risk perceived related to that indicator.
Our sample comprises 94 developing countries, situated in the lower and middle income
categories according to the World Bank classification10, with annual observation for the
period 1984-2009. Our choice of countries and period sampling was dictated by ICRG
data availability. The list of countries is given in appendix. More details on the data are
provided in table 6.
4 The results
The results of the homogeneity tests are reported in table 1. The hypothesis of homoge-
neous growth impact of FDI is widely rejected for political risk, investment profile, internal
and external conflicts, military in politics, democratic accountability and bureaucracy qual-
ity. As the impact of FDI is proven to be conditional on these variables, a PSTR model is
thus appropriate, with the previous indicators as transition variables. The homogeneity as-
sumption can also be rejected for law & order and ethnical tensions as transition variables,
however at the 10% significance level only. While the results of the test are less clear cut
for these two variables, the results of the PSTR estimates confirm their role in explaining
the heterogeneity of FDI impact on economic growth (see infra). Finally, the homogeneity
hypothesis is accepted for political stability and corruption. The impact of FDI on growth
is therefore independent of these two variables. This is somewhat disappointing as they are
often cited in the literature as important features of the institutional environment. How-
9See for instance Rodrik et al. (2004), Busse & Groizard (2008) and Busse & Hefeker (2007).
10Countries having in 2011 a GNI per capita lower than 12 476 current US dollars.
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ever, Harms & Me´on (2011) also found that the marginal effect of FDI does not depend on
the ICRG’s measure of corruption. Moreover, this result is robust to the change of proxies
being used, namely when using political stability and corruption control available in the
World Governance Indicators Database (see the last part of the table 1). This first step
thus allows to identify and to retain nine institutional indicators (among the eleven initial
candidates) that are likely to explain the cross-country heterogeneity of FDI effects.
Insert Table 1
In the second step, we perform the PSTR regressions according to equation (4), with
estimations reported in table 2. The results deserve several comments. First, all the
control variables have the expected sign and are highly significant. Second, we find the
direct impact of FDI on GDP growth, measured by β0, to be not significant in any of the
regressions, with two exceptions. However, in the latter cases, namely when the threshold
variables are external and internal conflicts, the direct elasticity of FDI is significantly
negative (at the 10% level). This result is in line with the consistent empirical literature
which fails to reveal a significant positive impact of FDI on growth (Carkovic & Levine
(2005)). The second line in table 2 offers some insight: the growth impact of FDI is actually
conditional on institutional development. More precisely, the β1 coefficient, associated with
the non-linear component of the model, is always positive and significant at the 1% level,
with values ranging between 0.126 and 0.229. Given the underlying logistic function, this
result implies that the elasticity of growth with respect to FDI varies from zero (as β0 is not
significantly different from zero in the majority of cases) to β1, as institutional indicators
range from low to high values. The shift between these two extreme regimes occurs around
the associated endogenous location parameter c. This result implies that without a sound
institutional framework, developing economies cannot benefit from foreign investment and
any FDI promotion policy would be, in this case, useless. Somewhat encouraging for
developing countries at this point is that the location parameters do not seem far from
their respective mean values (reported in table 4 in appendix).
Insert Table 2
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Nevertheless, the slope of the transition function should simultaneously be considered
for a comprehensive assessment on this point. The higher the γ, the sharper is the shift
from one extreme regime to another. Referring to table 2 and figure 1, where we plotted
the obtained elasticities11, the slope appears to be sharp for several indicators: political
risk, investment profile, internal and external conflicts12 and law & order. Considering for
instance the law & order indicator, any effort by a country just below the threshold value
of 2.09 is likely to result in a sharp increase of the elasticity of growth with respect to FDI,
from 0.0 to 0.126. However, for a country which is far below this threshold value, the same
effort will have no effect on the elasticity. Similar patterns are obtained for political risk,
investment profile, internal and external conflicts.
At the opposite, we identified a smooth transition when considering ethnical tensions,
democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality and military in politics. Interestingly, it is
precisely for these indicators that the threshold values are higher than their corresponding
mean values. Consider a country whose democratic accountability indicator is just below
the threshold value of 4.09. According to the smooth transition function, any improvement
in democratic accountability will result in a very gradual increase in the growth effect of
FDI (from 0.011 to eventually reach 0.225). As opposed to the sharp transition previously
described, any effort to improve institutional quality, even by a country far below the
threshold value, will always be rewarded (by a gradual increase in the marginal effect of
FDI). Similar patterns are expected with ethnical tensions, bureaucracy quality and, to a
lesser extent, military in politics13.
Insert figure 1
Our results thus validate the role of institutional quality in explaining the heterogenous
impact of FDI on economic growth. Moreover, the shape of the transition function and the
11Given the high number of countries in the sample, it would be confusing to precisely locate each of
them in figure 1. However, referring to the available ICRG database, it is quite straightforward to compare
the score of any country with the endogenous threshold parameters. In the same manner, considering the
time-varying impact of FDI for a given country, it is possible to restore the evolution of the elasticity
of GDP growth with respect to FDI, conditional on the evolution of institutional quality (whatever the
indicator).
12As the results with internal conflicts are very close to the one obtained with external conflicts, we
choose to only plot the former transition variable in figure 1.
13Note that the variety of profiles justifies ex post the use of a PSTR instead of a PTR model.
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location of a country with respect to the threshold value allow us to anticipate the effec-
tiveness of institutional reforms in terms of FDI-led growth. For immediate effects of such
reforms to be noticeable, improving institutional characteristics related to political risk,
law & order, investment profile and/or solving for external and internal conflicts appears
to be worthwhile, provided that the country is not far below the corresponding threshold
value. Due to a smooth marginal effect, improving democratic accountability, bureaucracy
quality, or solving ethnical tensions, are valuable in terms of absorptive capacity, even if
the country is far below the corresponding threshold values. Note also that the correlation
between the main features of institutional soundness can be high (see table 5). This means
that improvements in one variable are likely to have positive effects on other institutional
characteristics. A country can thus hope for institutional complementarities. Even for a
country that would be far from the aforementioned thresholds, reforms intended to improve
“smooth-transitional” variables would in the same time bring the “sharp-transitional” in-
dicators closer to their respective thresholds and eventually lead to a shift. Thus, small
efforts concerning these “smooth-transitional“ indicators could afterwards significantly in-
crease the elasticity of growth with respect to FDI.
The GMM estimations (Arellano & Bond (1991), Blundell & Bond (1998)), reported in
table 3 confirm the robustness of the PSTR results. While explicitly taking into account
the endogeneity of FDI, all interaction terms between FDI and institutions are positive and
significant, confirming the non-linear effect on economic growth. More, as in the PSTR
regression, FDI alone has a negative or, at best, a non-significant effect on growth. These
results reinforce our conclusion that FDI is growth enhancing only in countries having
attained a minimum level of institutional development.
Insert table 3
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the effect of FDI on economic growth conditional on the institu-
tional quality of host countries. Starting from the observation that countries with the same
level of FDI may experience very different outcomes in terms of growth, we consider host
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country heterogeneity, both in its individual and time dimension, to be a plausible explana-
tion for the different results of previous empirical studies. In line with the recent emphasis
on the role of institutions in economic growth, we associate host country heterogeneity to
institutional quality and show how it can influence the FDI-growth mechanism.
We first develop several theoretical arguments to show that institutional quality mod-
ulates the two main channels of FDI-led growth, namely knowledge spillovers and capital
accumulation. In the light of these arguments, we indicate that sound institutional quality
is expected to favor technology transfer and productivity spillovers to domestic firms, while
promoting crowding-in effects on domestic investment. Second, the use of a panel smooth
transition technique allows us to confirm the existence of heterogeneity and to identify an
endogenous threshold of institutional quality that influences the FDI growth effect. For
this purpose we use a sample of 94 developing countries over the period 1984 - 2009, with
11 institutional indicators stemming from the ICRG database.
Our main conclusion is that institutional quality clearly modulates the effect of FDI
on economic growth in developing countries. Our results show that FDI alone has no
significant effect on economic growth in developing countries, while a favorable institutional
environment induces a growth enhancing effect. This implies an elasticity of economic
growth with respect to FDI that is time and country varying. Our findings are robust to
the methodology used since similar results are obtained using the GMM estimator.
Two main policy implications can be derived from our results. First, the existence of a
threshold level of institutional quality that conditions the FDI growth effect sheds doubt
on the effectiveness of FDI attraction policies. More precisely, these policies will have no
benefit for host countries unless there is an improvement of their institutional framework
first. Therefore, sequencing is needed in implementing economic policies, with a priority
given to measures upgrading the local institutional environment before engaging in FDI
attraction policies.
Second, our results may provide guidance in constructing institutional reforms in de-
veloping countries, as they provide insights on the effectiveness of institutional reforms in
terms of FDI-led growth. More precisely, we show that certain features of institutional
quality have an immediate potential for fostering FDI-growth effect (smooth transitional
indicators), while others need an accumulation of efforts in order to allow FDI to become
16
growth-enhancing (sharp-transitional indicators). This remark has serious implications for
countries situated just below the threshold value of institutional quality. Any reforms in
the field of democratic accountability, bureaucracy quality, ethnical tensions or military in
politics will likely result in a gradual increase of FDI benefits, even for countries situated
far below the threshold. On the contrary, reforms focused on law and order, political risk,
investment profile or internal and external conflicts are only effective for countries close to
the threshold value. Nevertheless, due to institutional complementarities, reforms target-
ing specific features of institutional quality can actually bring other features closer to their
respective thresholds, therefore leading to a potentially incremental effect on growth.
17
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Threshold variable LM Test F Test Threshold variable LM Test F Test
Political risk 0.001 0.002 Bureaucracy quality 0.026 0.032
Government stability 0.665 0.681 Corruption 0.775 0.765
Investment profile 0.006 0.008 Military in politics 0.013 0.017
Internal conflicts 0.001 0.002 Law and Order 0.107 0.103
External conflicts 0.001 0.002 Ethnic tensions 0.104 0.120
Democratic accountability 0.001 0.002
WGI indicators:
Political stability 0.625 0.642 Corruption control 0.789 0.799
Table 1: LM and F tests of homogeneity (P-values)
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Figure 1: Elasticities of growth with respect to FDI - conditional on institutional indicators
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Appendix 1: Testing homogeneity against PSTR
We follow the procedure proposed by Gonzales & Al. (2005) for testing linearity against the
PSTR model. An easy way to examine the homogeneity of the effect of FDIit on yit would
equivalently consist in testing γ = 0 or β1 = 0 in (1) or (2), respectively. However, in both
cases the associated tests are nonstandard due to the presence of unidentified nuisance
parameters under the null (see Hansen (1996)). A solution consists then in replacing
g(qit; γ, c) in (1) by its first-order Taylor expansion around γ = 0. This leads to the
following auxiliary regression:
yit = µi + β
′∗
0 FDIit + β
′∗
1 FDIitqit + u
∗
it (5)
where the vectors β∗0 and β
∗
1 are proportionnal to γ, and u
∗
it is uit plus the remaining of
the Taylor expansion. Testing H0 : γ = 0 in (1) is equivalent to testing H0 : β∗1 = 0 in (5)
by a usual LM test or its F-version. Considering a panel of N countries over T periods
(i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T ), noting SSR0 the panel sum of squared residuals under H0
(linear panel model with individual effects) and SSR1 the panel sum of squared residuals
under H1 (PSTR model with m = 1), the corresponding LM statistics is computed as
LM = TN (SSR0 − SSR1) /SSR0, while the F-statistics is defined as LMF = (SSR0 −
SSR1) / [SSR0/(TN−N−1)]. Under the null hypothesis, the LM statistics is distributed
following a χ2(1), while the F-Statistics has an approximate F (1, TN−N−1) distribution.
Appendix 2: Details on the data
The countries in the sample are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Dem. Rep., Latvia, Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, Mon-
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golia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation,
Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Indicators Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum
Political risk 56.58 12.41 10.00 81.83
Government stability 7.32 2.37 0.67 12.00
Investment profile 6.31 2.18 0.00 11.50
Internal conlfict 7.94 2.56 0.00 12.00
External conflict 9.17 2.27 0.00 12.00
Corruption 2.49 1.02 0.00 6.00
Military in politics 2.95 1.64 0.00 6.00
Law & Order 2.99 1.20 0.00 6.00
Ethnic tensions 3.62 1.44 0.00 6.00
Democratic accountability 3.21 1.43 0.00 6.00
Bureaucracy quality 1.55 0.91 0.00 4.00
Table 4: Statistics of institutional indicators
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Variable Description Source
Growth The annual growth rate of GDP per capita. in 2000 USD WDI
FDI FDI net inflows as a percentage of GDP UNCTAD
Initial GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita, in the first year of each five year sub-period, WDI
expressed in constant 2000 US dollars
Population growth The annual growth rate of total population WDI
Domestic investment Gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP WDI
Trade openness Total imports and exports of goods and services as a share of GDP WDI
Government consumption General government final consumption as a share of GDP WDI
Inflation The annual increase in Consumer Price Index WDI
Assesses the overall political stability based on an weighted average
of the following components: Government stability, Socioeconomic
Political risk conditions, Investment profile, Internal conflict, External conflict, ICRG
Corruption, Military in politics, Religious tensions, Law and order,
Ethnic tensions, Democratic accountability, Bureaucracy quality.
Assesses the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs
Government stability and to stay in office. The risk rating assigned is the sum of 3 sub- ICRG
components: Government unity, Legislative strength and Popular
support.
Assesses factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered
Investment profile by other political, economic and financial risk components. The rat- ICRG
ing assigned is the sum of 3 subcomponents: Contract viability/exp-
ropriation, Profits repatriation, Payment delays
Assesses political violence in the country and its actual or potential
Internal conflicts impact on governance. The rating assigned is the sum of 3 subcomp- ICRG
ponents: Civil war/coup threat, Terrorism/Political violence,
Civil disorder.
Assesses the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action,
External conflicts ranging from non-violent external pressure to violent external press- ICRG
ure. The rating assigned is the sum of 3 subcomponents: War,
Cross-border conflict, Foreign pressures.
Assesses corruption within the political system. Includes demands
Corruption for special payments and bribes related to import and export ICRG
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, excessive patronage,
nepotism, ’favor-for-favors’, secret party funding
Military in politics Assesses the involvement of military in politics, as a reduction of ICRG
democratic accountability and distortion of government policy
Law and order Assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the ICRG
popular observance of the law
Ethnic tension Assesses the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, ICRG
nationality, or language divisions
Assesses how responsive government is to its people, assuming that
Democratic accountability the less responsive it is, the more likely it is that the government ICRG
will fall, peacefully in a democratic society, but possibly violently
in a non-democratic one
Assesses the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy as
Bureaucracy quality a shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of policy when ICRG
governments change
Table 6: Details on the data: definition and source
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